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RANDOM DRUG TESTING
IN THE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
by Idelle Abrams
I. Introduction
Employer attempts to monitor or regulate the behavior
of employees are as old as the employment relationship
itself.' The elements of employee conduct that an employer
may attempt to control often reflect behavior patterns of
concern to society as a whole. As drug use in American
society has escalated, employers are increasingly concerned
about employee drug use. Employers have engaged in the
practice of testing for the presence of drugs by analyzing
employees' urine specimens for several years. In 1986,
President and Mrs. Reagan announced an executive order
for a "Drug Free Federal Workplace" aimed at attacking
the pervasive problem of drug abuse.2 The order outlined
a program for mass drug testing of federal employees. In-
tended as a model to be followed by other employers,3 the
order focused attention on the substantial amount of testing
currently being conducted in the workplace by private as
well as public employers.
Unquestionably, the effects of drug abuse have
imposed an enormous social, psychological, and economic
burden on our society. Employers have focused primarily
on the economic effects of drug abuse. Employers have
four major motivations for instituting employee testing pro-
grams. 4 The first concern is the hidden cost of employee
drug and alcohol abuse as manifested in increased health
care expenses, greater absenteeism, and the cost of work-
related accidents. Employers are also concerned about their
potential legal liability for threats to the safety of the public
at large, especially as employers are "more and more fre-
quently . . . being held responsible for the actions of
employees. "5 Security issues are a third major problem.
Employee theft costs billions of dollars annually and can
bankrupt a business. In addition, some employers expect
their "employees [to] represent their employers twenty-four
hours a day, each day" and are therefore concerned about
employees' off-duty activity.
6
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Drug testing raises a host of issues for employees. The
right to privacy, considered by many to be essential to In-
dividual growth and development,7 is seriously compromis-
ed by the procedures used in random drug testing. The ran-
dom nature of the testing, done without reasonable suspi-
don or probable cause, presumes guilt, depriving employees
of their civil right to be considered innocent until proven
guilty. The high error rate of the most prevalent form of
urine testing8 raises due process issues. The focus on Il-
legal substances raises questions about the purpose of
testing, since problems in the workplace are largely the
result of alcohol abuse rather than marijuana or cocaine.
The value of drug tests that do not measure the level of
intoxication or the degree of impairment is questionable.
The ability of the tests to register the presence of drugs
for days or weeks after use allows the employer to monitor
the off-duty behavior of employees. And if employers can
randomly test for drugs with impunity, what is to prevent
a proliferation of other intrusive procedures and control
mechanisms using the same rationale?
In this article I will survey the courts' treatment of drug
testing for three different populations: state and federal
government employees, private sector employees covered
by collective bargaining agreements, and employees at will
in the private sector. Keeping in mind the unique
characteristics of each of these employee groups, the
analysis will include a discussion of the impact of random
drug testing on the right to privacy, the constitutional pro-
hibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, and
the exercise of employer prerogative.
There is a clear trend in the courts to declare the testing
of public sector employees to be invasive and violative of
privacy rights, while recognizing the need to weigh the in-
terests of employer and employee. Private sector employees
enjoy little protection against arbitrary employer actions
that affect their interests, including random drug testing or
dismissal for refusing to be tested. I will conclude that the
invasiveness of random drug testing does not depend on
the identity of the employer. The private sector employee
has the same need to be secure from invasions of privacy
as the worker who happens to be a government employee.
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II. The Methodology of Testing
There are three drug testing methods available to an
employer. The most common test is Syva's EMIIT (enzyme
immunoassay) test9 which is attractive because of its low
cost and the fact that it may be performed outside a
laboratory by relatively untrained personnel. The elements
that make the test attractive also render its usefulness ques-
tionable. The design of the test limits its accuracy10 as does
the great potential for operator error and specimen con-
tamination. Indeed, even the test's manufacturer recom-
mends that "[a]ny positive should be confirmed by an alter-
native method."" Studies have indicated that, even when
performed by recognized laboratories, the EMIT test can
generate a false positive result as often as 66 percent of
the time.1 2 Gas chromatography must be performed in the
laboratory, but yields a degree of inaccuracy similar to that
of the EMIT test. A mass spectrometer test will deliver ac-
curate results13 almost 100 percent of the time, but the
significantly higher cost of the test 14 dissuades employers
from using that method, even to confirm a positive EMIT
test.
The results obtained by these tests are of limited value
in the employment context. The EMIT test can detect the
presence of marijuana metabolites up to three weeks after
use of the drug and occasionally when the individual's on-
ly exposure was as a "passive smoker.""5 Many common
over-the-counter drugs can trigger a positive result: Advil
and Nuprin test positive for marijuana and Nyquil and Con-
tac may yield a positive result for amphetamines.' 6 The
test cannot detect intoxication or impairment of the in-
dividual in his or her job performance.' 7 An employer's pro-
per concern is with the performance of the employee on
the job; the exchange made between the employer and the
employee is wages for job performance. A test that does
not indicate impairment is not relevant to the employer's
proper concern of obtaining value for the wages he is
paying.
A urine specimen can also divulge significant informa-
tion about the physical state of an employee, well beyond
the possible evidence of drug use. Analysis can detect
pregnancy, diabetes, epilepsy, and other medical conditions
in addition to prescribed medications and other authoriz-
ed substances used by the employee.
III. The Right to Privacy
Invasion of privacy is clearly the greatest concern to
employees faced with mandatory drug testing. The
methodology of collection invades areas of behavior that
are unambiguously considered "private" and which, in fact,
are usually unlawful if conducted in public.
The value of privacy has been attested to by experts
in many fields' 8 and "may be linked to goals such as
creativity, growth, autonomy and mental health .... "-9
While concerns about privacy are generally recognized as
worthy, the courts must consider whether privacy is a legal
concept as well as a sociological or philosophical one. In
other words, has society recognized privacy as a legally
protected or protectable right? An analysis of this ques-
tion would have to begin by defining "privacy" and devis-
ing discernable boundaries. The number of discourses on
this question are ample evidence of the fact that this is no
easy assignment.20 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
often noted that the right to privacy is fundamental. 1
The right to privacy was first articulated by Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis in a seminal article 22 advocating
a common law tort that would protect the individual against
the unreasonable disclosure of his private affairs. Warren
and Brandeis were concerned that "[i]nstantaneous
photographs and [the] newspaper enterprise have invad-
ed the sacred precincts of private and domestic life."23 They
railed against the pursuit of gossip and its publication by
the press: "To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual
relations are spread broadcast in the columns of the daily
papers. To occupy the indolent, column upon column is
filled with idle gossip, which can only be procured by in-
trusion upon the domestic circle."24 Warren and Brandeis
sought to protect the "inviolate personality"25 of the in-
dividual. It is, they said, the prerogative of the private in-
dividual to communicate only those facts he wants known
to a broad audience.
26
The publication of this article had a profound effect
on subsequent jurisprudence as it was the source of the
"private facts" tort. At least 36 states 7 recognize a right
to privacy in the wrongful public exposure of private infor-
mation. In this respect Warren and Brandeis' "advocacy
of this new tort created a minor revolution in the develop-
ment of the common law."28 However, the exact nature
and scope of this revolution, almost 100 years later, are
hard to determine. The "private facts" tort collides with the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom
of the press with the result that plaintiffs rarely win.
Other causes of action adopting the right to privacy
arguments articulated by Warren and Brandeis arose from
the private facts tort. In 1960, Dean Prosser identified three
additional areas of tort law that invoke the right to
privacy. 29 These tort actions include "(1) misappropriation
of another's name or likeness; (2) unreasonable intrusion
upon the seclusion of another; and ... (4) publicity that
unreasonably places another in a false light before the
public."
30
A constitutional right to privacy, as opposed to the
common law right, was first described in Griswold u.
Connecticut3' as a right derived from the penumbra of the
guarantees of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments.3 2 Congress endorsed this constitutional right
to privacy when it enacted the Privacy Act of 1974 3 and
declared that "Congress finds that.., the right to privacy
is a personal and fundamental right protected by the Con-
stitution of the United States."3 4
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IV. The Fourth Amendment Guarantee Against
Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution "more
than any other explicit constitutional provision reflects the
existence of [some right to privacy and personhood]."35 The
significance of this Amendment has been described as
"second to none in the Bill of Rights."36 The Fourth Amend-
ment was a response to the common practice of authorities
in England and the colonies "to conduct random searches
of homes and businesses in search of evidence of law viola-
tions."37 The Amendment declares that:
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
The scope of protection afforded by the Fourth
Amendment depends on the judicial interpretation of
"search and seizure" and "reasonableness."38 The Court's
current analysis of search and seizure rests on the deci-
sion in Katz v. United States39 that freed the definition of
search and seizure from the requirement of physical inva-
sion. In Katz, the Court held that the plaintiff had a
justifiable privacy expectation that his telephone conver-
sation, conducted from a telephone booth, would not be
subject to electronic surveillance. The Court asserted that
"once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects
people - and not simply 'areas' - against unreasonable
searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of
that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence
of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure."
40
In his concurrence in Katz, Justice Harlan described
the rule currently governing Fourth Amendment analysis:
"[T]here is a two fold requirement, first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.' "41 The protection of the
Fourth Amendment can now be invoked in situations in
which individuals have a "justifiable," "reasonable," or
"legitimate"42 expectation of privacy. Absent such an ex-
pectation, there is no "search" within the meaning of the
Amendment as it has been interpreted by the Court.
4 3
V. Testing Employees in the Public Sector
A scant three months after President Reagan announc-
ed the executive order instituting random drug testing for
federal employees in "sensitive" positions, the courts
demonstrated a "clear trend toward declaring the tests
unconstitutional"44 under the Fourth Amendment. This
trend clearly continues, a year and a half later.4 5 Collec-
tion of a urine specimen has been seen by the courts to
be analogous to the involuntary taking of a blood sample,46
which was recognized by the Supreme Court in Schmerber
v. State of California47 to be within the meaning of the
search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment.
4 8
Based on Schmerber, most federal courts have found the
compulsory collection of a urine sample to fall within the
definition of a search and seizure 49 regardless of the ac-
tual degree of direct observation that is involved in the pro-
cedure."0
In order to "safeguard the privacy and security of in-
dividuals against arbitrary invasions by government of-
ficials," the Fourth Amendment "imposes a standard of
reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by govern-
ment officials. "sl Judges have generally found random
urinalysis testing for drugs by government agencies to be
beyond the bounds of reasonableness. One federal district
court judge vociferously denounced random testing saying,
"This dragnet approach, a large-scale program of searches
and seizures made without probable cause or even
reasonable suspicion, is repugnant to the United States
Constitution."5 2 Another district court judge described the
interests at stake when he said, "In order to win the war
against drugs, we must not sacrifice the life of the Con-
stitution in the battle."
5 3
The threshold question for Fourth Amendment
analysis is whether a demand for a urine sample is a search.
The next step is to determine the bounds of "reasonable-
ess" in conducting such a search, since the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibition applies only to unreasonable searches.
Generally, "[t]he Supreme Court has held that warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable under the fourth amend-
ment - subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions,"54 one of which appears to be
a class of cases involving government employees.
55
"Reasonableness" can be construed by "balancing the need
to search against the invasion which the search entails."
5 6
When the government is the employer, determining
reasonableness "involve[s] a balancing of the individual's
expectation of privacy against the government's right as
an employer [engaged in the] performance of its statutory
responsibilities."5 7
Applying the two-fold requirement articulated in Katz
to the collection of a sample for drug testing, the district
court in McDonell v. Hunter held that "urine is discharged
and disposed of under circumstances where the person cer-
tainly has a reasonable and legitimate expectation of
privacy."58 Katz's holding that it is not only areas but peo-
ple that are protected by the Fourth Amendment, led the
McDonell court to conclude that "[o]ne clearly has a
reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy in such
personal information contained in his body fluids."
59
Testing by the government, according to the court in
McDonell, can be done only when there is a "reasonable
suspicion, based on specific objective facts and reasonable
inferences drawn from those facts" 60 that a specific in-
dividual has engaged in drug or alcohol abuse. The
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reasonableness of a search is subject to a two-prong test.
The search, first, must be "justified at its inception," and
second, must be "reasonably related in scope to the cir-
cumstances which justified the interference in the first
place."6' Therefore, one court has upheld government man-
dated testing of bus drivers after a serious accident or if
there is sufficient evidence to suspect them of substance
abuse.62 However, testing teachers, police, or firefighters
en masse, without any evidence that would implicate an
individual in the suspicious activity, is not justified at its
inception so it is not within the authority of the state.
Testing of this sort might be an effective way to ensure
an unimpaired work force, but it is unreasonable and
therefore a violation of Fourth Amendment protections.
Nor may the government promulgate regulations requiring
all train crew members to undergo testing after an
accident 64 when such testing is not based on "specific ar-
ticulable facts [which] give rise to a reasonable suspicion
that a test will reveal evidence of current drug or alcohol
impairment."65 A drug-free workplace cannot be achieved
by denying the employees their constitutional rights. In the
words of the McDonell court, "the constitutionality of a
search cannot rest on its fruits."66
VI. Testing Employees Covered by
Collective Bargaining Agreements
Once we move to the private sector the analysis of
drug testing changes dramatically. Individuals employed by
private individuals cannot appeal to the Constitution for
protection. The rights granted to citizens by the Constitu-
tion protect them against "State aggression" only. The Con-
stitution, said the Court in The Civil Rights Cases,67 of-
fers no protection against the "wrongful acts of individuals,
unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws,
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful
act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority,
is simply a private wrong."68 The Fourth Amendment was
specifically excluded as a basis for a cause of action against
a private party in Burdeau v. McDowell.69 The Court said:
"It is manifest that there was no invasion of the security
afforded by the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable
search and seizure as whatever wrong was done was the
act of individuals in taking the property of another."7 0
The individual employed in the private sector can on-
ly look to statutory provisions or the common law of torts
to protect his rights as an individual. The individual who
is a member of a union, however, will be shielded from
some employer actions by the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement. The employer is under an obliga-
tion to bargain in good faith with the union regarding all
the terms and conditions of employment. 7' Randomly
testing all employees for drug use is considered a definite
change in the conditions of employment and must be the
subject of negotiation during collective bargaining. This has
been an effective means by which to prevent employers
from instituting random testing programs for unionized
employees.
However, testing that is not random or that comports
with prior guidelines for testing does not have to be
renegotiated. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
brought suit against the Burlington Northern Railroad
Company7 2 in response to the allegedly "unilateral im-
plementation of its urine testing policy."7 3 Railway workers
are unionized under the Railway Labor Act (RLA) 4 and,
according to the terms of the RLA, a "major" dispute must
be resolved through the collective bargaining mechanism.
The district court recognized that an attempt by Burlington
Northern to implement random testing of employees, i.e.,
testing that is not supported by a "modicum of evidence" 5
of substance abuse, would constitute a "major" dispute
because it would break with the prior practice of testing
based on sensory surveillance. As such it would be "sub-
ject to the status quo provisions of 45 U.S.C. § 156"6 and
the formulation of a testing policy would be a mandatory
subject for discussion in the collective bargaining process.
However, since the company was only amending the testing
that had already been in place the court found the practice
"'arguably justified' under the terms of the agreement ex-
tant between the Brotherhood and the [company]."
77
However, the Ninth Circuit, reversing the district
court,78 found that the new testing policy is a "clear change
in working conditions ... and thus, by definition, a major
dispute."7 9 The Court of Appeals based its decision on two
considerations. First, the court found "critical differences
between the old method and new method"80 of testing, The
old method, based on sensory surveillance, was "voluntary,
and required particularized suspicion," while the new
method, which would test anyone "involved in an operating
rule violation," is "mandatory, and requires only generaliz-
ed suspicion." 1
Second, the court found that the new method
presented "serious privacy intrusions." In discussing this
concern the court appealed to Fourth Amendment doctrine.
Though recognizing that the railroad company is not a
government agency and "is not subject to the restrictions
of the Fourth Amendment" '8 2 it found that the concern of
the employees was the same whether the employer was
the government or a company bound by a collective
bargaining agreement. The privacy expectations in both in-
stances "are related: Although the source of the invasion
is different, the privacy interest is the same."8 3 The court,
in a significant statement, concluded: "We decline to
assume that [the union] members implicitly granted [the
company] the authority to invade their privacy in ways the
government could not."
8 4
Arbitrators, in their determinations, have also found
a requirement to bargain collectively before random drug
testing can be imposed on employees. Recent rulings by
arbitrators found that the commissioner of the National
Football League could not impose a drug testing plan out-
side the collective bargaining agreement and could not
punish players (by imposing fines) who had refused to be
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tested for drugs.8"
A company that dismisses an employee for drug
related activity will often be held to a higher standard of
proof than in other dismissal actions. Arbitrators tend to
require employers to support drug charges by "clear and
convincing evidence," a harsher standard than the
"preponderance" of the evidence that is usually accepted.
The higher standard is applied, in part, because possess-
ion of a controlled substance would be a criminal offense
and in recognition of the fact that an employee discharged
for drug-related activity will not easily find another job.
86
In interpreting the ambigious terms of a collective
bargaining agreement, an arbitrator may impose conditions
and requirements on the employer that better serve the in-
tent of the provisions.87 An arbitrator's decision may call
for an employee to be given the chance to rehabilitate
himself before termination is effective.88 In contrast to many
employer wishes, arbitrators have also refused to treat drug
use as a more serious offense than alcohol intoxication.89
The collective bargaining agreement, on the other
hand, may limit an employee's ability to pursue remedies
outside the agreement. The grievance mechanism provid-
ed for under the collective bargaining agreement will
preclude a court action on a tort or contract claim by an
employee covered by the agreement.90 Nevertheless,
studies indicate that "arbitrators have overturned more drug
related discharges than they have sustained."9' A collec-
tive bargaining agreement, therefore, seems to offer real
protection to an employee charged with drug use.
VII. Drug Testing in Private Employment
Employees in the private sector who are not covered
by collective bargaining agreements (or some other con-
tractual arrangement) are essentially at the mercy of their
employers. "Employment at will" took root in the United
States in the late nineteenth century92 with the result that
employees "ceased to have legal rights in their employ-
ment."93 Employment at will construes the employment
relationship as one that is freely entered into by both
parties and can be terminated unilaterally by either party
at any time.94 While employment at will is still the reigning
theory in labor law, it has been qualified by legislative ex-
ceptions - e.g., child labor laws, minimum wage provi-
sions, equal opportunity requirements - and judicial ones,
for example, invalidating discharges that violate public
policy.
95
However, it is still true that "many of the rights and
privileges which are considered so important to a free so-
ciety that they are constitutionally protected from govern-
ment encroachment are vulnerable to abuse through an
employer's power."96 No issue can highlight this vulnerabil-
ity more than the one under discussion here. While ran-
dom drug testing by a government employer, performed
without reasonable suspicion, has been determined to be
an illegal search,97 private employers are subject to no such
qualifications and testing in the private sector has expand-
ed tremendously. It is estimated that "more than half of
the nation's largest companies have instituted testing pro-
grams,"9 8 most of them in the last few years.
The disparate treatment given private employees can
be seen if we look at the instance of an employee whose
test result was a false positive. The flaws of the EMIT test
are substantial enough to call into question any action
predicated on the results of that test.99 The test may be
performed by an individual who is inadequately trained and
under conditions which could lead to contamination of a
specimen. Since the test is not particularly sophisticated,
it may detect other substances that have similar chemical
characteristics. It will also detect signs of drug use that oc-
curred several weeks prior, as well as exposure to someone
else's marijuana smoke in your environment (with the pos-
sible result of monitoring whom you associate with).
Clearly there is a substantial danger that an employee
will be falsely accused of drug use. A government employee
or an employee covered by a collective bargaining agree-
ment will be protected by procedural safeguards that will
permit him to challenge the test result and speak on his
own behalf. In the private sector of at-will employment,
businesses, unfortunately, are willing to sacrifice those in-
nocent employees falsely accused in order to root out the
"bad" employee who is a drain on the company. The
employee has no procedural recourse. The harmful impact
of a drug abuse accusation on the employee and on his
or her prospects for future employment are no less serious
for the private sector at-will employee than for the other
two employee populations. The crucial difference is that
the at-will employee has no opportunity to repudiate a false
result. Damning the innocent to catch the guilty runs
counter to the motivating force of the American legal
system and offends our values and normative expectations.
Nor should it be relevant to the employer whether the
employee unwinds at night with a six-pack of beer or a pipe
of marijuana. The difference to the employee, under these
programs, is tremendous. The drinker can rest assured that
there will be no tell-tale signs of consumption, but the
employee who uses marijuana to effect the same result of
relaxation can lose his job. Performance may not be im-
plicated in either case, but one employee may be terminated
as a result of his off-duty behavior.
The phenomenon of drug testing is relatively recent
and testing in the private sector was a comparatively rare
occurrence only four years ago.100 The issue has not yet
been thoroughly litigated and it is difficult to predict the
bases on which the court will decide private sector drug
testing cases. An employee at will in the 1980s can ap-
proach the problem using various arguments, now that
state courts have nearly decimated the "pure" employment
at will doctrine.1 '
Employment at will has been modified by theories in
tort and contract. Courts have allowed actions in tort for
wrongful discharge when the discharge of the employee
violates a public policy. The public policy exception was
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first applied to employer actions that contravened a
statutory policy. In Petermann v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters Local 396,102 the court granted a cause of
action to an employee who was fired for refusing to com-
mit peijury at his employer's behest. Courts have also allow-
ed wrongful discharge claims when an employer fires an
employee for filing a workers' compensation claim because
the discharge violates the employee's explicit right to main-
tain a claim for compensation.
10 3
The courts have not limited wrongful discharge actions
to violations of express statutory policies. In Monge v.
Beebe Rubber Co., 0 4 the New Hampshire court recogniz-
ed a tort of abusive discharge when a female employee
claimed she was discharged for failure to provide sexual
favors to her foreman. The absence of an express prohibi-
tion did not inhibit the court from finding that the employer
had acted against the public policy of the state. Courts
have also supported the claims of "whistleblowers,"
employees who assert that the company is engaging in
some form of fraudulent activity.1
5
In a decision that could have a great impact on the
rights of employees subject to random drug tests, the Court
of Appeals in Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance
Company"6 found that an employer had wrongfully
discharged an employee who had asserted his First Amend-
ment right to freedom of political expression. Novosel, an
employee of Nationwide Insurance Company for fifteen
years, had a faultless work record prior to his termination.
-In October 1981, the employer was encouraging employees
to lobby for the "No-Fault Reform Act," then before the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives. Novosel alleged
that he was discharged for failing to lobby for the act and
for his "opposition to the company's political stand." 07
The court found that "taking into consideration the im-
portance of the political and associational freedoms of the
federal and state Constitutions ... a cognizable expres-
sion of public policy may be derived in this case from either
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution or
Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution."'0 8
The court endorsed the employee's First Amendment argu-
ment, even though it was being used within the employ-
ment at will context, saying that "the protection of an
employee's freedom of political expression would appear
to involve no less compelling a societal interest than the
fulfillment of jury service or the filing of a workers' com-
pensation claim." 0 9 This is the first case to characterize
a constitutional right as a "clearly mandated public policy,"
that is, one that "strikes at the heart of a citizen's social
right, duties and responsibilities."" 0
This decision also heralds the breakdown of the
public/private distinction. The effort to distinguish different
arenas as either public or private arose during the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries."'I With the development of the
nation-state "ideas of a distinctly public realm began to
crystallize." The response to the growth of this realm was
a "contervailing effort to stake out distinctively private
spheres free from the encroaching power of the state."' 
1 2
In the nineteenth century the public/private dichotomy grew
to be increasingly important as the market became the
focus of social and economic life and the participants
sought to insulate its activities from government interven-
tion. The separation of legal doctrine into public and private
law freed the market from the strictures of government
control.
Today government power reaches everywhere. There
is not now, if there ever was, a distinctly private realm. The
government plays an increasingly larger role in supplying
wealth to a significant segment of the population.' 13 This
"largess," said Charles Reich in The New Property, is af-
fecting "the underpinnings of individualism and in-
dependence.... It is helping to create a new society."I 
14
The expanding influence of the government is seen not only
in the distribution of "welfare state" benefits such as
unemployment insurance and social security, but in the
other intrusions government has made into the private
realm. Government is a major employer, a major consumer
of goods, a distributor of subsidies to private business, and
the owner and operator of public property. In addition,
through its power to license, it controls who can become
a doctor, open a restaurant, or drive a car."1- Conversely,
"private" individuals and corporations perform some of the
functions of government in providing various goods and
services. "The result of all this," said Reich, "is a breaking
down of distinctions between public and private and a resul-
tant blurring or fusing of public and private."' 16
Other commentators have echoed Reich's ideas and
expanded on them. The rise of "corporativism," the growth
of large, powerful organizations "whose internal procedures
and external contracts constitute a species of law mak-
ing," 1 7 has changed the texture of the private realm, ac-
cording to one writer. These entities wield considerable
power, often dictating the conduct of the government while
affecting entire communities and thousands of lives. Yet,
though clearly significant actors in the public arena, these
corporations are still nominally "private" and are treated
as such by the courts.
The public/private distinction is maintained in Fourth
Amendment analysis even though the "right of people to
be secure... against unreasonable searches and seizures"
is not limited, by the terms of the Fourth Amendment, to
those searches and seizures performed by the government.
However, the Supreme Court, in Burdeau v. McDowell,118
looked at the origin and history of the fourth amendment
and held that it does not apply to searches and seizures
performed by private parties that do not involve state ac-
tion." 9 Classifying a party or action as private is not an
easy task. As Judge Friendly has said, "If we now know
more about the location of the border between public and
private action, this is rather because the court has picked
out more reference points than because it has elaborated
any satisfying theory." 20
While courts must look for state action beyond the
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labels applied to a party, either "public" or "private," to pre-
vent government circumvention of Fourth Amendment pro-
tections, a search by a private entity that cannot be said
to constitute "state action" is not subject to constitutional
standards. 12 1 However, the state action doctrine is as vague
as the public/private distinction and the courts are not
always consistent in their use of the doctrine. In Novosel,
for example, the court said, "[a]lthough Novosel is not a
government employee, the public employee cases do not
confine themselves to the narrow question of state action.
Rather the cases suggest that an important public policy
is in fact implicated wherever the power to hire and fire
is utilized to dictate the terms of employee political ac-
tivities." 122
The public/private distinction seems even less defen-
sible in the labor law context. Besides the enormous power
exercised by employers today, government regulation of
the employment relationship - including minimum wage
laws, the forty-hour work week, race and sex discrimina-
tion provisions - and judicial modification of employment
at will leave no doubt that the "private contract of employ-
ment is no longer deemed entirely private." '
The public interest is also implicated in the
employer/employee relationship, as the court in Monge
clearly recognized. "In all employment contracts," the court
stated, "whether at will or for a definite term, the employer's
interest in running his business as he sees fit must be
balanced against the interest of the employee in maintain-
ing his employment and the public's interest in maintain-
ing a proper balance between the two." 4 The public, it
would seem, would have an equally significant interest in
protecting employee privacy interests in the employment
relationship. The language of the court in Novosel,
therefore, persuasively argues for a public policy exception
protecting at-will employees from employer activities that
are recognized as clear violations of the Fourth Amend-
ment when performed by government agencies against
government employees.
25
Another avenue an employee may explore is the at-
tempt to invoke the privacy tort formulation, articulated
by Prosser, to support his action against employer activity
that is considered invasive. "Unreasonable intrusion upon
the seclusion of another" is the action that most closely
approximates the analysis the Court uses when consider-
ing testing of government employees. The respect for the
seclusion of the employee when providing a sample for
testing has already been the focus of concern for the courts
in the governmental context, as has the intrusiveness of
the collection procedure. Whether the intrusion was
reasonable, in the context of private employment, could
be discerned by the court in much the same way it now
balances the competing considerations of the public
employer and employee. When it weighs the evidence, or
lack of same, implicating the employee in drug use, the
court considers the effect on public safety and describes
the employee's expectations of privacy. By adhering to this
familiar method, the court would effectively be abiding by
the terms of the search and seizure analysis as it is applied
in the public sector.
Employees bringing wrongful discharge actions have
occasionally succeeded in asserting an "implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing," 26 said to be implied in all
contracts including employment contracts. The cases in
which plaintiffs prevailed on this ground were distinguish-
ed as extreme cases of employer misconduct 127 and "as
yet there is no discernable trend toward adoption of a
general requirement of good faith and fair dealing as a
limitation on an employer's power to terminate employment
at will."' 28 However, a powerful case can be made for a
requirement of good faith and fair dealing when the issue
is drug testing. The strong possibility that an employee
would be wrongly accused of drug use, combined with the
stigma that would attach to that individual, the criminal
aspect of the accusation and the emotional distress that
would result could be considered severe enough employer
misconduct for an employee to assert that the employer
has an obligation to act in good faith before discharging
an employee for drug use.
Legislation, whether it be the use of current legislation
or the promise of proposed legislation, may offer another
avenue of protection for the employee required to undergo
testing. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973129 prohibits employ-
ment discrimination against handicapped individuals.1
30
Regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act included
alcoholics and drug addicts in the definition of a "handicap-
ped individual."' However, a 1978 amendment to the
Act1 2 made clear that this protection did not extend to
"an alcoholic or drug abuser whose current use of alcohol
or drugs prevents such individual from performing the
duties of the job in question or whose employment, by
reason of such current alcohol or drug abuse, would con-
stitute a direct threat to property or the safety of others."1
33
Forty-five states and the District of Columbia also have
laws prohibiting discrimination against handicapped
employees in the private sector.1
3 4
Whether the courts would allow an employee who
tested positive for drugs to argue that he or she is an ad-
dict and therefore is protected by the Act is unclear. In
Beazer v. New York Transit Authority13 5 the Supreme
Court held that the Transit Authority had a legitimate con-
cern for the safety of others, one of the affirmative defenses
provided under the 1978 Act, with respect to addicts who
were still undergoing treatment. However, employees
whose jobs do not implicate the safety of other individuals
have been found to have valid claims under the Act.1
3 6
The specter of mandatory drug testing in the private
sector has already begun to generate a legislative
response. 3 7 However, if the history of Congressional at-
tempts to regulate lie detector tests is any indication, federal
regulation of private-sector drug testing will not be achiev-
ed easily. The use of polygraph tests in the employment
context "now dwarfs the number of tests conducted for law-
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enforcement purposes ."13 Polygraphs, like drug tests, are
generally considered to be an invasion of an employee's
right to privacy. Employers nevertheless make extensive
use of the polygraph to detect employee deception,
especially employee theft. This use continues despite the
serious questions that have been raised about the accuracy
and reliability of polygraph evidence. 139 Questions about
the value of polygraph testing have led a majority of jurisdic-
tions to hold that polygraph results "are inadmissible in a
criminal proceeding notwithstanding the stipulation of the
parties."140 Arbitrators have also generally refused to ad-
mit polygraph results into evidence.14 1 "After over 85 years
of use, lie detectors have not been scientifically establish-
ed as providing reliable information on a person's lrustwor-
thiness or innocence." 42 Nevertheless, Congress has con-
sistently failed to pass legislation that would regulate the
use of polygraphs in employment, despite repeated at-
tempts to do so. 143 Employees will, however, find some
protection at the state level.
144
VIII. Conclusion
Drug abuse is a severe problem in American society.
Traffic in illicit drugs is a multi-billion dollar industry that
destroys lives and damages businesses and property.
However, beyond the fact that testing for drugs is no
panacea for the drug problem, it violates some of our most
deeply held principles - the right to privacy, the belief that
the innocent shall not be condemned with the guilty, the
appeal to act in good faith. The courts have found random
drug testing to be an egregious abuse of employer power
and have had no trouble declaring random testing to be
unconstitutional when performed by government
employers. The Ninth Circuit has found that the Fourth
Amendment privacy analysis applies as well to workers
covered by collective bargaining agreements. The cir-
cumstance of employment in the private sector, rather than
in the public sector, does not significantly change the ex-
perience of being an employee or the level of intrusiveness
of the testing procedure. The courts have compiled a body
of precedent that qualifies employment at will, including
the public policy exception, the implied contractual require-
ment of good faith and fair dealing, and the recognition
of the harshness of employer power articulated in Novosel.
These principles impose on employers a limited duty to ter-
minate only when there is just cause. They also present
a solid basis on which the court can build an analysis that
holds private employers to standards, recognized in the
constitutional analysis, of reasonable suspicion for drug
testing. Judicial determinations along these lines would
comport with the general treatment by the courts of drug
testing in other employment arenas.
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